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At the end of April, a coalition of Tuareg fighters and jihadist militias overran military bases held by the Malian armed forces and their Russian allies, driving the Russian Africa Corps (former Wagner mercenaries) along with soldiers loyal to the ruling military junta out of the northern city of Kidal.
Large swaths of northern Mali have since fallen under the control of this unlikely alliance. The online magazine Nationalia, published by the Catalan NGO of the same name, has examined the rapidly shifting dynamics on the ground.
The Azawad separatist movement FLA, in coordination with Tuareg forces and the jihadist group JNIM, succeeded in expelling the Malian army – which had held the region since 2020 – along with Africa Corps personnel from northern Mali. The FLA declared Kidal liberated, while both the JNIM and the FLA seized the town of Tessalit, located north of Kidal. Further south of the city, Malian government troops and Russian mercenaries likewise withdrew from their positions.
Why Kidal?
Kidal represents the historic heartland of Tuareg nationalism and is a strategically significant town in the desert region of Azawad. Azawad stretches across more than one million square kilometres, sharing borders with Algeria, Mauritania, Niger and Burkina Faso. The Tuareg, a nomadic Amazigh people inhabit the Sahel and the Sahara. They are bound together by a shared language and cultural identity.
Kidal has repeatedly found itself at the centre of armed conflict, playing a pivotal role in each of the four Tuareg uprisings against the Malian state (1962–1964, 1990–1995, 2007–2009 and 2012).
The Tuareg accuse the Malian army and Russian mercenaries of being responsible for killing countless people since 2021. The FLA denounces the systematic destruction of villages and their infrastructure as “atrocities”.
The Tuareg describe Malian rule as a “tyranny”. Yet Azawad is far from ethnically homogeneous: alongside the Tuareg, the region is also home to Arab, Sonrai and Fulani communities. The Sonrais and Fulani opposed the Tuareg’s independence project.
The Kidal region is a major hub in the drug trafficking networks that crisscross the Sahel. The informal “tolls” collected on these routes are a guaranteed source of funding for those who control them.
Who are the FLA and JNIM?
The FLA (French acronym for Azawad Liberation Front) brings together Tuareg and Arab groups. The organisation is led by Alghabass Ag Intalla, a Tuareg who oscillates between Tuareg nationalism and Islamism. In an interview with France24 in 2025, FLA spokesperson Mohamed Elmaouloud Ramadane stated that independence remains his organisation’s goal.
Among the founders of the FLA, established two years ago, was the secular Movement for the National Liberation of Azawad (MNLA), which proclaimed the independence of Azawad in 2012 and briefly occupied Timbuktu and Gao. Its counterpart within the alliance is the Islamist High Council for Azawad Unity (HCUA), also led by Alghabass Ag Intalla.
The jihadist group JNIM maintains close ties to Al-Qaeda and operates across Mali and Burkina Faso. Its membership is drawn from Mali’s majority ethnic groups, including the Fulani and Sonrai, as well as Arabs, Tuaregs, Bambara and Dogon. JNIM spokesman Iyad Ag Ghali is a Tuareg, as is FLA chairman Alghabass Ag Intalla.
These two men were formerly rivals, when they competed for dominance in Kidal. Now the two tuareg are cooperating, having coordinated their efforts in the recapture of the city.
The current situation draws comparisons with 2012, when the FLA’s predecessor, the MNLA, and Ansar Dine, which would become the nucleus of JNIM, formed a similar alliance of convenience. That partnership enabled the occupation of northern Mali and the proclamation of the independent state of Azawad. In the subsequent power struggle, Ansar Dine prevailed and established an Islamist regime, before French military intervention allowed the Malian army to retake the north.
Whether this “unholy” partnership between the FLA and JNIM will prove more durable is an open question.
The 2020 coup and its consequences
In 2020, the coup leaders expelled French troops from the country and sought closer ties with Russia. Russia has been combating Islamist insurgents through heavy weaponry, military support from the Africa Corps as well as diplomatic and political assistance.
The coup leaders have framed their rapprochement with Russia as an “anti-colonial” stance, following the model of the juntas in Niger and Burkina Faso, which together form the Alliance of Sahel States. Backed by substantial Russian support, the Malian army launched an offensive against Kidal in November 2023, seeking to expel the MNLA.
Two and a half years later, the fall of Kidal stands for the failure of Mali’s partnership with Russia. The Tuareg have demonstrated a clear capacity to bring large parts of Azawad under their control, while the jihadist JNIM has also asserted its presence in the region.
In 2024, Tuareg separatists and JNIM fighters inflicted a defeat on the Malian military and its Russian mercenary allies near the Mali-Algeria border, in the Battle of Tinzaouaten.
According to Nationalia, Algeria observes developments in and around Kidal with growing concern. The Kidal region spans more than half of the border between the two countries, making stability a strategic priority for Algieria, which has sought to contain both secessionist and jihadist threats along its southern frontier.
In 2015, Algeria brokered a peace agreement between the Malian government and Tuareg and Arab armed groups. The Malian junta now considers Algeria’s continued engagement an interference in Mali’s internal affairs.
Relations between the two countries have deteriorated since 2023. In January 2024, the junta formally terminated the 2015 agreement, a move that has contributed to an escalation of military operations by Azawad armed groups and increased hostilities along the Mali-Algeria border.
Mali has also recognised Morocco’s sovereignty over Western Sahara, receiving in return the prospect of Moroccan investment and access to the Atlantic coast. This initiative was poorly received in Algiers, which supports the right to self-determination of the Western Saharan people.
Multiple crises in a complex context
Since its independence, Mali has politically and economically failed to integrate the north. The Tuareg uprisings represent a “cyclical manifestation of this failure”, according to Nationalia.
The magazine further argues that the jihadist expansion of JNIM is not merely an imported phenomenon, but a consequence of the marginalisation of indigenous populations by the Malian state. Many Fulani of central Mali support the JNIM.
Nationalia also points to what it calls the broader “geopolitical game”. In a Sahel region characterised by fragile and weakening states, Russia, France and Morocco are all involved, while China and Turkey are also providing for the junta.
All armed actors operating in the region – FLA, JNIM, pro-government militias and elements of the regular army – are competing for control over the trans-Saharan routes. These corridors carry ‘legitimate goods’ but are equally central to illicit trade: drugs, especially cocaine from South America gets moved to Europe, fuel and migrants. All actors seek profit, either directly or through ‘tolls’.
Territorial control over Azawad is therefore not solely a matter of national sovereignty, nor simply the expression of a religious project pursued by the jihadist JNIM, as Nationalia analyses. It is also about securing and generating revenue to maintain leverage in any future negotiations.